Special Operations (Chindits) in India Burma theater during WWII

  

This article was first published in India Study Circle journal (India Post No. 233, Vol. 58 No. 4) in October-December 2024. The second part of special operations (Merrill's Marauders) was published in MPHS Journal as shared in my previous post. Now that I have decided to revive my blog, I thought of sharing that article as well. That will allow readers to get complete picture of allied special operations that were launched to push Japanese out of Burma and prevent invasion of India by Japanese and Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose.

 

Behind Japanese Lines: The Allied (British-Indian-African-Commonwealth) Jungle Force (Chindits)

This article is about Special Operations conducted by Allied forces (Great Britain and United States) against Japanese forces during second world war in India-Burma theater. In general, South-East Asia theater is less popular than other war zones of second world war. Allied main focus was naturally Europe, Middle East, Africa and Pacific zones. We hear many stories of special operations and various exploits from those zones. This article tries to highlight one of the similar exploits from South-East Asia theater through postal covers.

 

Even though, we have various Virk ([1], [2]) and Proud ([3], [4]) catalogues/books available to refer (from FPO usage point of view), some of the fighting units are poorly documented. Sometimes, we see conflicting information among (about usage of Indian/British FPOs by various units) them. I have tried my best to present information as much as possible accurately, but there is possibility of the errors. I would request experts to point out any such mistakes, missing information and provide their valuable feedback.

 

Every special operation conducted during WW2 had its own purpose and clearly defined objective e.g., sabotage enemy plans or assist main fighting forces to defeat them, sometimes they were also used as a propaganda tool even in case of failure of such operation. In some historian’s view ‘Chindits’ operations were one of them. They were viewed as propaganda tool in the beginning specially their first offensive called ‘Operation Longcloth’ which then set path for second and wider offensive known as ‘Operation Thursday’. We would mostly focus on the latter offensive in this article via British/Indian FPO covers from the said period and modern day (post-Independence) Indian Army Postal Service covers commemorating some of those Indian units which participated in it.

 

About the Chindits (quick introduction)

The Chindits, officially known as Long Range Penetration Groups (LRP), were special operations units of the British and Indian armies (also consisted of Africans, Americans, Burmese, Chinese and other allied nationalities) which saw action in 1943–1944 during the Burma Campaign of World War II.

 

The British Army Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate formed the Chindits (Long Range Penetration Groups) for raiding operations against the Imperial Japanese Army, attacking Japanese troops, facilities, and lines of communication deep behind Japanese lines. Their operations featured long marches through extremely difficult terrain, undertaken by underfed troops often weakened by diseases such as malaria and dysentery.

 

Controversy persists over the extremely high casualty-rate and the debatable military value of the achievements of the Chindits. Historians have different views on Chindits operations such as they believed Wingate’s ideas were flawed in many respects. For one thing, the Imperial Japanese Army did not have Western-style supply lines to disrupt and tended to ignore logistics generally. When Special Force launched itself into Burma in March 1944, Wingate’s ideas rapidly proved unworkable. However, Mutaguchi Renya (the commander of the Japanese 15th Army), later stated that ‘Operation Thursday’ had a significant effect on the campaign, saying "The Chindit invasion had a decisive effect on these operations. They drew off the whole of 53rd Division and parts of 15th Division, one regiment of which would have turned the scales at Kohima".

 

Operation Longcloth as propaganda tool

Even though first Chindit offensive ‘Operation Longcloth’ which took place between February and June 1943 was a military disaster and many officers in the British and Indian army questioned the overall value of the Chindits based on the losses incurred during the first long-range jungle penetration operation (LRP), Wingate viewed it as a psychological triumph.

 

He sent 61-pages operation report back to London (which was also passed on to Churchill) which viewed the Chindits and their exploits as a success after the long string of Allied disasters in the Far East theatre. Churchill, an ardent proponent of commando operations, was complimentary toward the Chindits and their accomplishments. It was seen as a propaganda tool which proved that Japanese could be beaten, and British/Indian troops could successfully operate in the jungle against experienced Japanese forces.

 

>Churchill was so much impressed that he asked Wingate to travel with him to The First Quebec Conference, codenamed ‘Quadrant’. It was a highly secret military conference held during WW2 by the governments of the Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. It took place in Quebec City on August 17–24, 1943, at both the Citadelle and the Château Frontenac

 

Fig 1: Major General Orde Charles Wingate

 

Concept of Long-Range Penetration (LRP) Operation and birth of ‘Operation Thursday’

At the Quebec Conference in 1943, Wingate explained his ideas to Franklin D Roosevelt, and other leaders. Wingate proposed creating strongholds in enemy territory that would be supplied by air and be as effective against the enemy as conventional troops. He presented ideas of deep penetration operations that could be made possible through improvements in the range of communication devices and airborne supply by long range aircraft.

 

It was decided that operations against Japan would be intensified in order to exhaust Japanese resources, cut their communications lines, and secure forward bases from which the Japanese mainland could be attacked. Wingate was promoted to Major General and given green signal to plan for second offensive.

 

The second long-range penetration mission was originally intended as a coordinated effort with a planned regular army offensive against Japanese forces in northern Burma, but events on the ground resulted in cancellation of the army offensive, leaving the long-range penetration groups without a means of transporting into Burma. Upon Wingate's return to India, he found that his mission had also been cancelled for lack of air transport. He took the news bitterly, voicing disappointment to all who would listen, including Allied commanders such as Colonel Philip Cochran of the 1st Air Commando Group (USAAF). Cochran told Wingate that cancelling the long-range mission was unnecessary; only a limited amount of aerial transport would be needed since, in addition to the light planes and C-47 Dakotas Wingate had counted on, Cochran explained that 1st Air Commando had 150 gliders to haul supplies. Thus, a new plan was formed relying on gliders to drop brigades in Burma.

 

Units of 2^nd Long Range Penetration Offensive (Operation Thursday)

 

Fig 2: Cover sent from Saugor Infantry School (postmark) to Bombay, India on 22^nd March 1944 (just after Operation Thursday began) with Unit Censor V44 handstamp.

 

While first Chindit offensive had jungle long range penetration unit created from 77^th Indian Infantry Brigade which were trained at a special camp setup (Fig 2) at Saugor district in central India, for second offensive Wingate was given six brigades (77^th Indian Infantry, 111^th Indian Infantry, 14^th Brigade of British 70^th Division, 16^th Brigade of British 70^th Division, 23^rd Brigade of British 70^th Division and 3^rd West African Brigade of 81^st West African Division).

 

77^th Indian Infantry Brigade (also known as “EMPHASIS”)

At the heart of this operation was existing 77^th Indian Infantry Brigade (first LRP). They continued to train in jungles of central India until Dec’43 (by [3]) or Feb’44 (by [1]) when finally, they were given order to move towards forward bases of North-East India for the campaign.

 

Fig 3: Cover sent from FPO 81 to England on 11^th Jan 1944 (before Operation Thursday began) with Unit Censor U1 and Field Censor 113 handstamp.

 

Indian FPO 81 was used by 77^th Indian Infantry Brigade until March 1944 before they entered Burma. FPO didn’t go with them. Wingate planned that part of 77^th Brigade would land by glider (as per new plan) in Burma and prepare airstrips into which 111^th Brigade and the remainder of 77^th Brigade would be flown by C-47 Dakota aircraft. Two landing sites codenamed "Piccadilly" and "Broadway" were selected. On the evening of 5^th March 1944 as Wingate, Lieutenant General Slim (the commander of Fourteenth Army), Brigadier Michael Calvert (the commander of 77^th Brigade) and Cochran waited at Lalaghat airfield in India for 77^th Brigade to fly into "Piccadilly", an incident occurred.

 

Fig 4: On Golden Jubilee of 77 Mountain Brigade (Chindits), Indian Army Postal Service issued APS cover commemorating their exploits in 1992.

 

Fig 5: Operation Thursday Air Launch Map

 

Wingate had forbidden continuous reconnaissance of the landing sites to avoid compromising the security of the operation, but Cochran ordered a last-minute reconnaissance flight which showed "Piccadilly" to be completely obstructed with logs. There was confusion that the operation had been betrayed, and that the Japanese would have set up ambushes on the other two landing sites. Slim still ordered that the operation was to go ahead. Wingate then ordered that 77^th Brigade would fly into "Chowringhee" (new landing site). Both Cochran and Calvert objected, as "Chowringhee" was on the wrong side of the Irrawaddy and Cochran's pilots were not familiar with the layout. Eventually, "Broadway" was selected instead.

 

Despite the last-minute drama, the operation was finally flagged off half an hour after the planned time at 18:12. Each C-47 Dakota towed two gliders – all were overloaded to at least 4500 pounds, bouncing and swaying all the way down the airstrip, headed for the Chin Hills in the darkened sky. The original plan called for 40 gliders to go to both Piccadilly and Broadway but finally all 80 would go to Broadway starting the airborne stage of ‘Operation Thursday’. The mission was no longer in the hands of Wingate and his staff; it rested with the pilots of the 1^st Air Commando Group. In all, 35 gliders crash landed on Broadway that night. Fortunately, the Japanese were unaware of the landings. 

 

1^st Air Commando Group of USAAF

Fig 6: Cover sent from US APO 690 Ondal, India to USA on 11^th Feb 1945 with Passed by US Army Examiner 13676 handstamp. It was sent by 6^th Fighter Squadron of 1^st Air Commando Group.

 

To comply with Roosevelt's proposed air support for British long range penetration operations in Burma (agreed during Quebec conference), the United States Army Air Forces (USAAAF) created the 5318th Air Unit to support the Chindits. In March 1944, they were designated the 1st Air Commando Group by USAAF Commander General Hap Arnold. Arnold chose Colonel John R. Alison and Colonel Philip Cochran as co-commanders of the unit. It provided fighter cover, bomb striking power, and air transport services for the Chindits, fighting behind enemy lines in Burma. Operations included airdrop and landing of troops, food, and equipment; evacuation of casualties; and attacks against enemy airfields and lines of communication.

 

Their first joint operation with the Chindits—Operation Thursday—was the first invasion of enemy territory solely by air and set the precedent for the glider landings of Operation Overload associated with the Normandy Landings on D-Day. They also used helicopters in combat for the first time, executing the first combat medical evacuations. They pioneered the use of air-to-ground rockets.

 

111^th Indian Infantry Brigade (also known as “LEOPARD”)

Unaware of Wingate given authority to have far more ambitious offensive for his second LRP expedition (during Quebec conference), General Wavell (also the Viceroy of India) ordered the formation of 111^th Indian Infantry Brigade, along the lines of the 77^th Indian Infantry Brigade at the same time when Wingate was on the way to India. Wavell intended that the two brigades would operate in tandem with one engaged on operations while the other trained and prepared for the next operation. However, once back in India, Wingate was allowed to have six brigades to achieve the goal. He was known to have a strong dislike for the Indian Army, its diverse troop formations, and its British officers. He maintained that their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Gurkha and Indian castes and religions, although he had little choice but to accept 111^th Brigade.

 

111^th Indian Infantry Brigade was due to flown into Piccadilly on 5/6^th March 1944, but as that landing site was unusable, so it flew into “Chowringhee” and “Broadway” instead. This left the brigade dispersed and ineffective until it was reunited at “White City”. The goal for 111^th Brigade was to move north and build a new stronghold, codenamed ‘Blackpool’ which would block the railway and main road south of Mogaung. Blackpool was close to the Japanese northern front and was immediately attacked by Japanese 53^rd Division with heavy artillery support. Even though a heavy attack against Blackpool was repulsed on 17^th May, a second attack on 24^th May allowed Japanese to capture vital positions. Because the monsoon had broken and heavy rain made movement in the jungle very difficult, neither 77^th Brigade nor 14^th Brigade could help 111^th Brigade. Finally, it had to abandon Blackpool on 25^th May, because the men were exhausted after 17 days of continual combat. They were finally evacuated from Mogaung in the May.

 

Indian FPO 143 was used by 111^th Infantry Brigade until March 1944 before they flew into Burma. The FPO didn’t carry them. From May’1944 onwards same FPO was reallocated to 109 Infantry Brigade (14^th Infantry Division).

 

Fig 7: On Golden Jubilee of 3^rd Btn, 4^th Gurkha Rifles which was part of 111^th Indian Infantry Brigade, Indian Army Postal Service issued APS cover commemorating their exploits in 1990. Part of it was also in Morris Force which harassed Japanese forces in the mountain ranges.

 

Fig 8: On Platinum Jubilee of 3^rd Btn, 4^th Gurkha Rifles which was part of 111^th Indian Infantry Brigade, Indian Army Postal Service issued APS cover commemorating their exploits in 2015. The postmark shows Chindits logo as well.

 

16^th Infantry Brigade of British 70^th Division (also known as “ENTERPRISE”)

When Wingate returned to India from Quebec conference with authority to implement far more ambitious plans for the second expedition, which required that the force be greatly expanded to a strength of six brigades, he was offered British 70^th Division. infantries were required, three brigades (the 14^th, 16^th and 23^rd) were added to the Chindits by breaking up the experienced British 70^th Division, much against the wishes of General Slim and other commanders, who wished to use the division in a conventional role.

 

British 70^th Division was a very experienced unit seen action in the Middle East and Africa. Following the Japanese occupation of Malaya, and the consequent threat to India, British 70^th Division was withdrawn from the Middle East at the end of Feb 1942 and sent to India. 16^th Brigade of British 70^th Division, was temporarily detached for service in Ceylon, arriving there on 15^th Mar 1942. On 1^st Feb 1943, the brigade moved to India to join 70^th Division. British FPO 40 accompanied 16^th Brigade to Ceylon and Ceylonese stamps were used while they operated there.

 

Fig 9: Cover sent from Ceylon to England using British FPO 40 in March 1942 (after they just arrived from Middle East) with Passed By Censor 90 handstamp.

 

The plan for 16^th Brigade was different as they were supposed to march to its operational area from Ledo while 77^th and 111^th Brigades were getting airlifted later. The 16^th Brigade began its 350-mile (565-km) overland advance on 5^th February 1944 starting ‘Operation Thursday’ officially, avoiding the Japanese by crossing extremely difficult terrain.

 

It took them close to 4 weeks (5^th March 1944) to reach Chindwin River crossing point. It was at the same time (6^th March 1944) when Japanese launched Operation ‘U-Go’, an invasion of eastern India. It would take them another tough two weeks march south to reach their first objective, a stronghold named “Aberdeen” (20^th March 1944). It existed only on paper and in the mind.

 

Wingate intended that “Aberdeen” should rise from the ground on the labor and toil of 16^th Brigade after their long march. From there they moved towards Indaw. He hoped that the three brigades could then co-operate in the capture of the communications nexus at Indaw, together with its airfield, so that a division could be flown in to hold the area as a base for the Chindit columns roving the Japanese rear areas and wreaking havoc. Though, 16^th Brigade failed to occupy Indaw and were withdrawn to India by May 1944.

 

14^th Infantry Brigade of British 70^th Division (also known as “JAVELIN”)

Initially, 14^th Brigade was supposed to be held in reserve along with 23^rd Brigade and 3^rd West African Brigade. But, when Japanese threat at Imphal and Kohima started developing, General Slim thought of diverting 14^th Brigade just like he did with 23^rd Brigade to help Indian XXXIII Corps. There were tense moments for Wingate as he was furious losing out another of his brigade. Finally, Slim let Wingate keep 14th Brigade for Burma offensive.

 

The 14^th Infantry Brigade was airlifted to ‘Aberdeen’ on 23/24 March 1944 (same time when Wingate died in plane crash). While 16^th Brigade thought 14^th Brigade would help it capture ‘Indaw’ which was south to Aberdeen, 14^th Brigade instead moved north towards ‘Blackpool’ and was involved in heavy fighting in the area with the Japanese. It helped 111^th Brigade capture Blackpool in May before eventually it was withdrawn to India in August 1944.

 

Fig 10: Cover sent within India using British FPO 199 on 23^rd August 1944 (after 14^th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn to India) with Field Censor 35 and Unit Censor S 471 handstamp.

 

As per [4], BFPO 199 was used by 14^th Brigade. It states that as a Special Forces P.O. it was used from Dec’43-May’44 period. Though, there is some conflicting information on it. Because, as per same catalogue it also states BFPO 37 was allotted to 14^th Brigade. While, as per [2] [Ch. 22 The Assam Front, Page 247], it says BFPO 199 was allotted to 23^rd Brigade. So, it can’t be ascertained if BFPO 199 was used by 14^th Brigade even though it was used by one of the units of Special Forces. For now, I am sticking to Proud where it shows 14^th Brigade against BFPO 199.

 

23^rd Infantry Brigade of British 70^th Division

It never joined the Chindits in the field, was instead sent to support XXXIII Indian Corps to quell Japanese attackers (Operation “U-Go” on 6^th March 1944) in the Dimapur and Kohima area. But their training as LRP came handy and in fact it was one of the reasons why Japanese 31^st division had to retreat when they ran out of supply during the siege of Kohima.

 

Fig 11: Above diagram shows 23^rd Infantry Brigade action against Japanese 31^st division from April-July 1944

 

Japanese 31^st Division had begun the operation with only three weeks supply of food. Once these supplies were exhausted, the Japanese had to exist on meagre captured stocks and what they could forage in increasingly hostile Naga villages. The British 23^rd Infantry Brigade, which had been operating behind the Japanese division, cut the Japanese supply lines and prevented them foraging in the Naga Hills to the east of Kohima. Lack of food supply from Japanese Fifteenth Army HQ finally caused Japanese 31^st division to withdraw.

 

Fig 12: Cover sent to Bombay, India using British FPO 30 on 5^th July 1944 (just after Battle of Kohima was over by 22^nd June 1944 and 23^rd Infantry Brigade was on pursuit of retreating Japanese forces towards Ukhrul and Imphal until end of July) with Field Censor 33 and Unit Censor G 573 handstamp.

 

As per [4], British FPO 30 was used by 23^rd Infantry Brigade in India. While [2] [Ch. 22 The Assam Front, Page 247], says BFPO 199 was allotted to 23^rd Brigade though it doesn’t provide any further information on it. Similarly, since [1] also doesn’t show BFPO 199 usage by 23^rd Brigade so I am assuming Proud is correct to state BFPO 30 usage for 23^rd Infantry Brigade.

 

3^rd West African Brigade of 81^st West African Division (also known as “THUNDER”)

The 3^rd (West African) Brigade was to be used as garrison troops for the strongholds. One battalion was flown into Broadway and made its way on foot to Aberdeen. The other two battalions were flown directly into Aberdeen on 23^rd March 1944. The brigade returned to India by August 1944. The brigade was disbanded on 30^th November 1944. It then reformed with same units in India on 1^st March 1945 coming under command of 81^st West Africa Division on 20^th March 1945.

 

All West African Units in Burma (during Chindits operation and afterwards as part of larger Burma campaign) used British FPOs. As per [1]British FPO 670, 696-699 were used by 81^st West African Division including their time (Dec 1943 - March 1945) in Burma so perhaps one of those FPOs were used by 3^rd West African Brigade as well. I will allow experts to weigh in and share their thoughts.

 

Fig 13: “On Active Service” cover sent with in India using British FPO 698 by 81^st West African Division along with Unit Censor G 139 handstamp in March 1945. This is just an example of 81^st West African Division usage in absence of any definitive cover usage by 3^rd West African Brigade.

 

Other units

Finally, there were Morris Force which harassed Japanese forces in the mountain ridges skirting the Bhamo-Myitkyina Road and then there was DAH Force a small 74 men team which had Kachins of 2^nd Burma Rifles as well Chinese from Hong Kong volunteers. DAH was a diversified team with British, Americans, Indians, Kachins and Chinese in it. Besides them there were other units supporting Chindits operations, but I am skipping them to concentrate only on the main ones.

 

Fig 14: Cover sent to Bombay, India using British FPO 145 on 7^th Jun 1943 (before the second Chindits offensive) with Unit Censor E 101 handstamp.

 

As per Proud and Virk, in general BFPO 30/37/40/145/199 were used by British 70^th Division Special Forces (meant for LRP) at different point in time. So, I am showing usage of BFPO 145 though there is no clear information in either [1] or [3] which British Infantry Brigade was using it.

 

Fig 15: On Silver Jubilee of 4^th Btn, 9^th Gurkha Rifles which was part of Morris Force, Indian Army Postal Service issued APS cover commemorating their exploits in 1987. Since the battalion was re-raised in 1961 that’s why it says Silver jubilee although 9^th Gorkha Rifles regiment was originally formed by the British in the 1817. On this occasion a special postmark showing Chindits symbol was also issued.

 

Fig 16: On Diamond Jubilee of 4^th Btn, 9^th Gurkha Rifles, Indian Army Postal Service issued APS cover commemorating their exploits in 2021. Note that it shows 1961 as starting year as stated earlier.

 

Conclusion

While Wingate and allies were unaware of timing of Japanese plans of invasion of India, at the same time, Operation Thursday timing just coincided with it and did cause damage to Japanese offensive. As shared earlier in the introduction section while historians have different views on overall effect of the special operations and seen in various Brigade brief history above, the operations may not have achieved its original goal as it had to face strong Japanese Army, it did have huge psychological effect on the Japanese Army as they created havoc by disrupting food supply and communication lines. Chindits used to appear all sudden from dense forest of Burma, attack Japanese columns and used to hide again in the forest well supported by Nisei and Kachins. They created fear in Japanese minds.

 

Acknowledgement

Some of the background information including maps have been sourced from Wikipedia. Various FPO usage has been referred from British and Indian Army Postal Services Catalogues/Books by Proud and Virk as mentioned below.

 

References:

[1]             History of Indian Army Postal Services – D. S. Virk

[2]             Indian Army Post Offices in the Second World War – D. S. Virk

[3]             History of the Indian Army Postal Service Volume III - Proud

[4]             British Army Postal Service Vol III – Proud

 

I also expect there may be errors on selecting or describing postal history of the FPO covers. Please feel free to correct me and share any relevant FPO covers that one may have (either for exhibit or sale) directly at my email-id jbareria@gmail.com. And do read the second part of the article showcasing American Special Operations which were launched at the same time in my earlier post.  

Merrill’s Marauders Campaign in India Burma theater during WWII

 

It's almost 11 years since I wrote a blog. I was asked by many well wishers and friends to continue writing, sharing items from my collection. But, I have been lazy (also occupied in personal and professional life). Finally, I decided may be it's time I should break the ice. The article below has been published in Military Postal History Society (MPHS) July'25 edition (Vol 63 No 3). My friend Apratim has also generously published it on his website. I would like to encourage readers to reach out to me with your valuable feedback on it (story, philatelic and ephemera items shown etc.). Also, please browse through Apratim's great website to dive on various aspect of India's freedom struggle and pre-independence history through philately.

 

I must say it was by chance that I stumbled upon Merrill's Maraduers story. The more I researched the more I got addicted to this special operation. I browsed many websites, US military history archives and read various books on them to understand deeply enspiring, motivating and daring campaign which has almost been forgotten in the pages of the history. I hope you all will like it. Let's not waste any more time. So, here it is ...

 

Behind Japanese Lines: The American Jungle Force (Merrill's Marauders)

 

This article is about Special Operations conducted by Allied forces (primarily United States, Chinese and British) against Japanese forces during second world war in India-Burma theater. This operation was launched almost at the same time when Chindits started their ‘Operation Thursday’, and it was complimentary allied effort to recapture Burma.

 

American strategy in the China Burma India (CBI) theater was built around keeping China in the war. American war supplies kept the Chinese fighting. Since the Japanese controlled the Burma Road and the Chinese coast, the USAAF established an aerial resupply route from Assam, India to Kunming, China through Himalayan Mountain passes nicknamed “The Hump.” But it was hazardous and costly. Adverse weather and collisions with cloud-cloaked mountains caused almost daily aircraft losses. The U.S. needed an alternate solution. The obvious answer was to build another road that circumvented the Japanese-controlled Burma Road.

 

In December 1942, U.S. Army engineers began construction on the Ledo Road from upper Assam in India. It would cut across north Burma to Lashio, south of Myitkyina, to meet the original Burma Road. It was a daring effort. The plans for the Ledo Road included the laying of pipelines, designed to relieve the road and air traffic of carrying fuel from Assam to China. But a ground campaign was necessary to secure the route of the Ledo Road through north Burma. That’s where Merrill’s Marauders special operations came into the picture.

 

The end goal of this operation was Myitkyina’s capture. General Stillwell’s idea was by securing its airfield Japanese fighter threat to the “Hump” resupply line would be eliminated and the USAAF pilots could fly a shorter and safer route over lower terrain into China. The new lower altitude air route would reduce gasoline consumption and permit heavier cargos. The city of Myitkyina could serve as a major supply depot along the Ledo Road route.

 

Fig 1: Merrill’s Marauders area of operations Feb-May 1944 and Ledo Road construction on the same route.

 

About the Merrill’s Marauders or Galahad

At the Quebec Conference in 1943, Allied leaders decided to form a U.S. long range penetration (LRP) unit that would attack Japanese troops in Burma. The new U.S. force was directly inspired by, and partially modeled on British General Orde Wingate's Chindits Long Range Penetration Force. A call for volunteers attracted around 3,000 men. They came from Caribbean Defence Command (already jungle trained), South Pacific Command and Southwest Pacific Command (all already battle tested jungle troops. The unit was officially designated as 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) with the code name Galahad.

 

General Stilwell was worried that 5307^th Unit might also be placed under South East Asia Command (SEAC) under British influence as it was LRP unit similar to Chindits meant for special operations in Burma against Japanese. But he was determined to keep exclusive U.S. combat troops available in the theater out of British command. He was able to persuade Admiral Lord Mountbatten, the supreme Allied commander of the South East Asia Command (SEAC), that they should serve under the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) which was controlled by him.

 

 

Fig 2: Brigadier General Frank Merrill

 

Stilwell appointed Brigadier General Frank Merrill (Fig 2 & Fig 3) to command the new LRP unit. Merrill had served earlier as Military Attaché in Tokyo where he had studied the Japanese language in 1938. After that he joined General Douglas MacArthur's staff in the Philippines in 1941 as a military intelligence officer. Merrill was on a mission in Rangoon, Burma, at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack and remained in Burma after the Japanese invasion. So, he was considered just the right man for the job which needed combination of Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Combat capabilities in Jungle terrain of Burma with familiarity of the Japanese.

 

 

Fig 3: A scarce cover sent by Brig. General Merrill with his signature at bottom left corner to a Boy Scout troop on Sep 4, 1944, Washington DC just one month after Merrill’s Marauders were disbanded in August 1944.

 

Initially, the plan was to get troops trained under Wingate command along with Chindits but later the 5307th (Fig 4) trained at Deogarh, India from the end of November 1943 to the end of January 1944. All officers and men received instruction in scouting and patrolling, stream crossings, weapons, navigation, demolitions, camouflage, small-unit attacks on entrenchments, evacuation of wounded personnel, and the then-novel technique of supply by airdrop. Special emphasis was placed on "jungle lane" marksmanship at pop-up and moving targets using small arms. In December the 5307th conducted a weeklong maneuver in coordination with Chindit forces.

 

 

Fig 4: Soldier's Free Mail from A.P.O. 884 Agra, India by Bronze Star awardee Emil H. Eichhorn of H.B. Prov. Unit 5307 (Merrill's Marauders) to New York with Passed by US Army Examiner Censor marking. The cover is dated Dec 14^th, 1943, when they were under training at Deogarh coordinating with Chindits and just before Merrill’s Marauders started their expedition to Burma in February 1944. Emil would become part of 2^nd Battalion (Blue Combat Team).

 

Several American war correspondents had come to Deogarh to hear about the unit and its training; the reporters sat around trying to think of an appealing nickname for the 5307th that would capture the interest of the American public. Time correspondent James R. Shepley came up with "Merrill's Marauders" after viewing the 5307th's performance on the firing ranges and that name stuck. Afterwards,the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), which was a LRP special operations jungle warfare unit became Merrill’s Marauders which saw action between Feb-Aug 1944 during the Burma Campaign of WWII.

 

 

Communications

Communications was most crucial element in this whole campaign. Since the battalions were to be always on the move and most of the time behind enemy lines, it was necessary to carry long and short-range radios providing constant communication with headquarter for orders, supply arrangements, and air cooperation, and within the unit itself for control of the columns. While they were equipped with long-range PRC-I (for communication to the base station at Dinjan), SCR 284 radios (for 20-mile range) and later with SCR 300 (Walkie-Talkie), operating and maintaining them in the terrain was found to be very challenging. This is where 96^th Signal Battalion personnel, few assigned with Merrill’s Marauders battalions to manage communication systems and remaining to support them from Dinjan and various other locations came handy.

 

Fig 5: Letter sent from 96^th Signal Battalion with APO 487 (Dinjan, India) with passed by US Army Examiner censor marking on Aug 21, 1944 (just after battle of Myitkyina was over) to USA.

 

The 96th Signal Battalion (Fig 5) was called upon to construct, maintain and operate an intricate signal communications system in the jungle of Burma. It involved managing around-the-clock telephone, teletype, radio, and messenger service connecting and coordinating HQ, Chinese Y-Forces, Merrill’s Marauder’s units and British Fourteenth Army. The entire battalion saw prolonged service with combat units serving side by side with Merrill's Marauders along the Ledo Road from Ledo to Myitkyina, under intense enemy shell fire overcoming various technical challenges in radio communication.

 

 

Campaign

On the advice of Wingate, the unit was divided into two self-contained combat teams per battalion. In February 1944, in an offensive designed to disrupt Japanese offensive operations, three battalions in six combat teams (coded Red, White, Blue, Khaki, Green, and Orange) marched into Burma. On 24 February, the force began a 1,000-mile march over the Patkai range and into the Burmese jungle behind Japanese lines. A total of 2,750 Marauders entered Burma; the remaining 247 men remained in India as headquarters and support personnel. This was different than Chindits operation where they were airdropped behind enemy lines in Burma.

 

Since it was highly mobile force operating behind the enemy's forward defensive positions, there was need to find a solution of regular supply to the force. It was not feasible to maintain regular land supply lines given Ledo Road was still work in progress and then it would have greatly reduced tactical mobility and would have made secrecy impossible, contradicting the express purposes of the operation. Air dropping of food and munitions, though still in an experimental stage of development, had been satisfactory for Chindit's 1^st expedition of 1943 and was adopted for the LRP missions of the Marauders.

 

Fig 6: Letter sent from APO 487 Dinjan, India by 2nd Troop Carrier Squadron to APO 81 Camp San Luis Obispo, California dated Nov 21, 1943, with US Army Examiner Censor marking.

 

At the beginning of the Marauders' operation the 2nd Troop Carrier Squadron (Fig 6) and later the 1st Troop Carrier Squadron (Fig 7) carried the supplies from the Dinjan base to forward drop areas. They dropped by parachute engineering equipment, ammunition, medical supplies, food, clothing and grain flying in all kinds of weather.

 

Fig 7: Letter sent from APO 467 Sookerating, Assam, India by 1st Troop Carrier Squadron using concession airmail to USA dated Dec 13, 1944.

 

While in Burma, the Marauders were usually outnumbered by Japanese troops from the 18th Division, but always inflicted many more casualties than they suffered. Led by Kachin scouts, and using mobility and surprise, the Marauders harassed supply and communication lines, shot up patrols, and assaulted Japanese rear areas. The Japanese were continually surprised by the heavy, accurate volume of fire they received when attacking Marauder positions. In March they severed Japanese supply lines in the Hukawng Valley.

 

In April, the Marauders were ordered by Stilwell to take up a blocking position at Nhpum Ga and hold it against Japanese attacks, a conventional defensive action for which the unit had not been equipped. At times surrounded, the Marauders coordinated their own battalions in mutual support to break the siege after a series of fierce assaults by Japanese forces. At Nhpum Ga, the Marauders killed 400 Japanese soldiers, while suffering 57 killed in action, 302 wounded, and 379 incapacitated due to illness and exhaustion. A concurrent outbreak of amoebic dysentery further reduced their effective strength.

 

Fig 8 (Rare item): Letter sent by Lt. William Lepore's (1 Bn, White Combat Team) mother from Everett, MA, US to him in India dated May 8, 1944. Initially addressed to APO 884 (Agra which was serving the 5307^th before they were dispatched to Burma), redirected to APO 883 (Malir, Karachi) where no record was found and then finally to APO 886 (Karachi) where it was checked in 181st General Hospital also. There was no record of him found anywhere. Finally, it was found that he had died in China (June 6, 1944). Perhaps, he got injured during the campaign and was airlifted to China along with injured Chinese X-forces. He was awarded Silver Medal.

 

On May 17, 1944, after a grueling 100-kilometre march over the 6,600 ft Kumon Mountain range to Myitkyina, approximately 1,300 remaining Marauders, along with elements of the 42nd and 150th Chinese Infantry Regiments of the X Force, attacked the unsuspecting Japanese at the Myitkyina airfield. The airfield assault on May 17, 1944 was a complete success; however, the town of Myitkyina could not immediately be taken with the forces on hand.

 

Fig 9: Letter sent by Pvt. Julius Michini who was part of 236^th Engr. Battalion on July 27^th, 1944, from one the hospitals established along the Ledo Road after he was wounded in the battle and airlifted. He writes about losing most of his personal belongings and a good friend in the battle.

 

Stillwell called upon the 209^th and 236^th Engineer Combat Battalion (Fig 9) to the front lines (who were already working on the Ledo Road behind Marauders). Men who had been used to driving trucks and operating heavy equipment were suddenly picking up a rifle and heading into battle. They fought along with reinforced poorly trained Chinese army and Marauders, bearing the brunt of the Japanese forces, defending against infantry attacks as well as artillery and mortar fire. There were 56 killed and 142 wounded persons from the 236^th battalion alone. The battalion (and 209^th) received Presidential Unit Citation for their valiant effort in the battle.

 

Weakened by hunger, the 5307th continued fighting through the height of the monsoon season, worsening the situation; it also transpired that the area around Myitkyina had the largest reported incidence of scrub typhus, which some Marauders contracted after sleeping on infected areas of untreated ground, earth or grass. Racked with bloody dysentery and fevers, sleeping in the mud, Marauders alternately assaulted, then defended in a seesaw series of brutal conventional infantry engagements with Japanese forces. The town finally fell to the Allies on August 3, 1944 due to combined efforts of various units involved.

 

In their final mission against the Japanese base at Myitkyina, the Marauders suffered 272 killed, 955 wounded, and 980 evacuated for illness and disease; some men later died from cerebral malaria, amoebic dysentery, and/or scrub typhus. By the time the town of Myitkyina was taken, only about 200 surviving members of the original Marauders were present. On August 10, 1944, a week after the town's fall to U.S. and Chinese forces, the 5307th was disbanded with a final total of only 130 combat-effective officers and men (out of the original 2,997).

 

Fig 10: Letter sent from APO 218 Myitkyina, Burma by 151st Medical Battalion using concession airmail to USA dated Mar 31, 1945.

 

Marauders suffered overall 424 battle related casualties and 1970 disease related casualties. They were evacuated by 71^st Liasion Squadron from the combat zone after they had been treated by medical corpsmen or surgical teams. Medical battalion detachments marched in the columns, established aid stations during battle, collected and gave emergency treatment to casualties, and cared for the sick. Air clearing stations (ACS) were essential links in the chain of evacuation. The ACS could be opened or closed on short notice, or it could become the nucleus of a major evacuation center. The 151st Medical Battalion (Fig 10), which became one of the main ground evacuation units manned the roadside hospitals or in the rear field of the battle. After initial treatment, most of them were transported to the 20^th General Hospital, the 14^th Evacuation Hospital (Fig 11), or the 111^th Station Hospital in the Ledo area.

 

Fig 11: Vmail sent by a female nurse working for 14^th Evacuation Hospital dated June 11, 1943 using APO 689 (Ledo, India). Located at Ledo Road, Mile 19.

 

Since the hospitals were overwhelmed with high number of patients as the battle of Myitkyina extended, there was need to increase the beds. During June 1944, the 69th General Hospital and the 28th, 32d, 34th, 35th, 50th, and 53d Portable Surgical Hospitals arrived in Ledo. The 69th general hospital (Fig 12) was established at Margherita, several miles from the 20th General Hospital, and the portable surgical hospitals were flown over the “Hump" to support the Y-Force operating in the Salween River area.

 

Fig 12: Vmail sent by a sergeant from 69^th General Hospital on Nov 16, 1944 which was located at Margherita (near Ledo).

 

In slightly more than five months of combat behind Japanese lines in Burma, the Marauders, who supported the X Force, advanced roughly thousands of miles through some of the harshest jungle terrain in the world, fought in five major engagements (Walawbum, Shaduzup, Inkangahtawng, Nhpum Ga, and Myitkyina) and engaged in combat with the Japanese Army on thirty-two occasions. Battling Japanese soldiers, hunger, and disease, they had traversed more jungle on their long-range patrols than any other U.S. Army unit of the war.

 

OSS and Kachins

While the main unit of the campaign was the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), the article won’t be complete if we don’t mention the contribution of Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Kachins. It was the only ground organization involved in all parts of the campaign. During the long fight, Detachment 101 came of age to become an indispensable asset for the Allied effort. The unit evolved from an intelligence collection and sabotage force to an effective guerrilla element.

 

Fig 13: Letter sent by Rodney B. Yould, SP1C (P) USNR, APO 629 Chabua, HQ, Detachment 101 to USA; dated May 13, 1944 during the Marauder’s campaign.

 

Detachment 101 (Fig 13) was the first overseas unit created under the Special Operations (SO) branch of the Coordinator of Information (COI), the predecessor to the OSS. Its agents reported on enemy order of battle, the political situation in Burma, and the weather. The advantage with Det. 101 was their agents had infiltrated Burma in 1942 itself. So not only the agents became familiar with the region, but also, they recruited indigenous agents, the Kachins.

 

The Kachins were fierce warriors, and experts in guerrilla hit-and-run tactics and jungle craft. They were natural hunters. Best of all, they were pro-Allied and liked Americans. Every time they got a chance to knock off a [Japanese] patrol they did it because it was a psychological play. The Kachins sped up the Marauder advance by providing so much intelligence on Japanese troop movements that it reduced the need to send out advance reconnaissance patrols. Each of the three Marauder battalions had two dedicated Kachin guides. They are credited with saving two-thirds of Merrill’s forces during the siege of Nphum Ga.They led the Marauders unseen to the Myitkyina Airfield on May 16, 1944.

 

Fig 14: Front and last page from the vintage cartoon story called “The Secret Warriors: OSS in Burma” published by True Comics in 1946 showcasing assistance and exploits of OSS Detachment 101 and Kachins during Merrill’s Marauders Burma Campaign.

 

Detachment 101 was the only American or British ground force that participated in the Myitkyina Campaign to remain intact afterwards. The Marauders and the Chindits had been rendered ineffective, mostly by disease. The remaining Marauders still on their feet became the cadre of the 475th Infantry Regiment, one of two in the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), known as the MARS Task Force. The Chindits never returned to the field and were disbanded in February 1945. The war was over for them, but not for Detachment 101.

 

The OSS guerrilla units continued to intercept Japanese elements fleeing south, preventing them from regrouping, refitting, and being able to stand against the Allied drive after the monsoon stopped. In August 1944, the Detachment added several hundred more Japanese killed to their accomplishments. The reality was that the OSS guerrillas were the only Allied element maintaining contact with the Japanese south of Myitkyina until October 15, 1944, when NCAC resumed its offensive. The OSS had proved itself to be an extremely capable “wild card” maneuver force.

 

By the time of its deactivation on July 12, 1945, Detachment 101 had scored impressive results. According to official statistics, with a loss of some 22 Americans, Detachment 101 killed 5,428 Japanese and rescued 574 Allied personnel.

 

Fig 15: Merrill's Marauders Bronze Medal Collector's edition issued by US Mint

 

The men of Merrill's Marauders enjoyed the rare distinction of having each soldier awarded the Bronze Star. Their campaign was hailed as one of the most successful Guerrilla offensives in most harsh condition against the Japanese. Warner Bros. decided to make a war film “Objective, Burma!” starring Errol Flynn (Fig 16), which was loosely based on the six-month raid by Merrill’s Marauders in the Burma campaign in 1945 itself immediately after the raid.

 

Fig 16: “Objective Burma” an American war movie original lobby card of 1945 showing actor Errol Flynn inspecting troops.

 

The movie also contains a large amount of actual combat footage filmed by U.S. Army Signal Corps cameramen in the China-Burma-India theatre as well as New Guinea. It was the studio's sixth most popular film of the year and one of the most popular movies of 1945 in France.

 

There was also the controversy because it was said that movie was inspired by a book about an attempted British invasion of Burma called Merrill's Marauders and it was decided to change the troops from being British to American. However, Merrill's Marauders was an American unit. The movie was withdrawn from release in the United Kingdom after it infuriated the British public. Prime Minister Winston Churchill protested the Americanization of the huge and almost entirely British, Indian and Commonwealth conflict ('1 million men'). It got a second release in the United Kingdom in 1952, when it was shown with an accompanying apology. The movie was also banned in Singapore although it was seen in Burma and India.

 

It was clear that each allied country had their pride in special operations conducted by Chindits and Marauders. Together, not only they stopped Japanese advances to India but also laid ground for Japanese defeat in South East Asia by reclaiming Burma.

 

References:

[1]             Merrill’s Marauders February – May 1944, Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D.C., 1990 (https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/marauders/marauders-fw.htm)

[2]             A Special Forces Model OSS Detachment 101 in the Mytkyina Campaign (https://arsof-history.org/articles/v4n1_myitkyina_part_1_page_1.html#fall)